The Silent Claimant: How Brunei’s Quiet China Diplomacy Fractures ASEAN Unity
BANGKA — While global superpowers trade barbs and neighboring Southeast Asian states deploy warships to assert maritime boundaries, one quiet nation is changing the geopolitical landscape of the South China Sea through sheer silence.
A new study published in the Priviet Social Sciences Journal (December 2025) reveals that Brunei Darussalam's calculated "soft power" strategy and economic alignment with Beijing are quietly undermining ASEAN’s ability to present a unified front against China's sweeping maritime claims.
The research, titled "The silent claimant state: Brunei Darussalam in the South China Sea Region," was conducted by Endah Kurniati and Jamal Din Aulia from Universitas Bangka Belitung, alongside Dwi Putro Wibowo Laksono from Universitas Darussalam Gontor.
A Defensives Stance Fueled by Oil Dependence
The South China Sea is a volatile geopolitical flashpoint, coveted for its strategic shipping lanes and massive natural resources—estimated by the U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA) to hold 11 billion barrels of oil and 190 trillion cubic feet of natural gas. Major claimant states like the Philippines, Vietnam, Malaysia, and Taiwan have long locked horns with Beijing over its unilaterally drawn "Nine-Dash Line".
Yet, Brunei Darussalam has consistently maintained a low-key, defensive posture. According to the researchers, this pragmatism is survival-driven:
Economic Vulnerability: Brunei's economy is heavily dependent on oil and gas, which account for roughly 95% of its export revenue and 90% of government income.
The Domestic Slump: Facing domestic economic recessions, the Sultanate has prioritized fiscal stabilization over territorial confrontation.
Louisa Reef Claim: Though Brunei maintains a claim over Louisa Reef based on continental shelf boundaries under UNCLOS, it has never publicly or aggressively asserted sovereignty over the wider Spratly Islands.
The Price of Beijing's Incentives
Rather than deploying naval patrols like Indonesia did near the Natuna Islands, or taking Beijing to international court like the Philippines, Brunei chose bilateral economic diplomacy. Since a pivotal diplomatic shift in 2013, Brunei has willingly embraced China's joint exploration schemes and capital investments.
"Brunei, as a small claimant state, prefers using soft power to remind—not assert—its territorial claim; it emphasizes economic cooperation based on friendship, trust, and goodwill," the authors note.
This bilateral synergy has yielded major industrial fruits for the Sultanate, including the massive Brunei-Guangxi Economic Corridor and the Pulau Muara Besar petrochemical project, backed heavily by Chinese state investors. In exchange, Brunei has permitted Chinese capital and human resources to extract oil and gas directly within its Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ)—even in areas where maritime borders overlap with Beijing's claims.
The ASEAN Fracturing Effect
Brunei’s strategic calculus represents a double-edged sword. While it successfully keeps the local economy humming and defuses immediate military tensions with Beijing, it creates severe friction within the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN).
The study highlights that during Brunei's ASEAN Chairmanship in 2013, the country leveraged its position to cushion China from multilateral pressure. Brunei even famously boycotted an informal meeting of ASEAN claimant states hosted by the Philippines to avoid taking an adversarial stance against Beijing.
By prioritizing its immediate financial survival through bilateral deals, Brunei joins other economically aligned nations like Laos and Cambodia in loosening ASEAN's collective diplomatic clout. This diplomatic division leaves China as the biggest geopolitical winner, effectively neutralizing regional resistance to its maritime expansion.
Source: Kurniati, E., Laksono, D. P. W., & Aulia, J. D. (2025). The silent claimant state: Brunei Darussalam in the South China Sea region. Priviet Social Sciences Journal, 5(12), 67-76. https://doi.org/10.55942/pssj.v5i12.1002